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Abstract—Data-driven false data injection attack is one of the
emerging techniques in smart grids, provided that the adversary
can monitor the meter readings. The basic idea is constructing at-
tack vectors from the estimated signal subspace, without knowing
system measurement matrix. However, its stealthy performance is
significantly influenced by the accuracy of the estimated subspace.
Furthermore, it is computationally demanding, because full-size
singular value decomposition (SVD) is required for model order
selection. In this paper, we propose a truncated SVD based
computationally efficient attacking scheme using only the first
dominant eigenvector. Both experiment and simulation results are
provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme.
Compared with the standard false data injection techniques
with known measurement matrix, similar stealthy performance
is achieved with a reasonable computational complexity.
Index Terms—Data-driven false data injection attack, smart
grid, subspace method, bad data detector
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and communication systems are widely used in
power grids. However, they have convenient entry points for
malicious attackers and are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Al-
though it is possible to compromise the control center directly,
in practice, existing security measures make it unlikely [1], and
it is more realistic to assume that the attackers have access to
the field devices, and the associated supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) communication channels, because
they are geographically scattered over a large area, and lack
adequate protection features. Here we focus on the false data
injection (FDI) attacks against direct current (DC) linear state
estimation in power grids [2]–[4]. In general, attacks on the
measurements can be detected by bad data detector (BDD).
But a well designed FDI attack vector that lies in the subspace
spanned by measurement matrix can remain stealthy to the
BDD [5]. The basic idea is to learn the measurement matrix
or estimate its subspace structure from the meter readings.
Using such vulnerabilities, crafting stealthy data-driven FDI
attacks from the measurement data are shown in [6] and [7].
Principal component analysis (PCA) and independent com-
ponent analysis (ICA) [7]–[9] are two widely used projec-
tion methods for subspace based data-driven stealthy attacks.
Recently, low rank matrix recovery techniques [10], [11]
are consolidated to launch such an attack from incomplete
measurements [12], [13]. Another interesting extension is
considering alternating current nonlinear state estimation [14]–
[16]. Here we focus on PCA based data-driven FDI attacks
against DC linear state estimation. The basic idea of PCA
is to find a set of principal components such that the pro-
jected measurements retain most information about original
measurements. However, one limitation of the existing PCA
based data-driven FDI attacks is determining the pseudorank
[7], [17], which is defined as the rank of the noiseless data
matrix and depends on the number of measurements and the
correlation of the system states [18]. Full-size singular value
decomposition (SVD) is required to estimate pseudorank.
Therefore, the computational complexity is high, especially for
large scale systems. Furthermore, for the existing data-driven
techniques, performance degradation occurs if the nominated
and actual pseudorank are mismatched. Besides the pseudo-
rank, the error of the estimated eigenvectors are also critical,
which are inversely proportional to the eigenvalues [19]. In
general, larger errors will cause larger residuals, and therefore
increase the probability of being detected by BDD.
To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a computa-
tionally efficient implementation scheme for data-driven FDI
attack , where only the first principal component is utilized to
construct the attack, and pseudorank estimation and full-size
SVD are not required, which leads to significant reduction
in computational complexity. Furthermore, compared with the
standard FDI attack, which assumes that the measurement
matrix is known, similar stealthy performance is achieved for
the proposed data-driven scheme. Even though the proposed
technique is introduced for power grids, the key idea can be
applied to other linear cyber-physical systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, some preliminaries are provided. In Section III,
we present the proposed stealthy data-driven FDI scheme.
Experiment and numerical results are provided to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in Section IV.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notation: Transpose and inverse operators are denoted as
(·)T and [·]−1, respectively. We use Im to represent the identity
matrix of size m. Moreover, the blackboard bold letter R
denotes the set of real numbers, rank(·) and col(·) denote the
rank and column space of a matrix.R(A) is the space spanned
by A. The ℓ2-norm is denoted as ‖ · ‖2.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The set of nodes in power grids is denoted by N =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. The voltage phase angle at node i during time
slot t is denoted by xi[t], i ∈ N , which corresponds to the
system state at time t for a DC power flow model. The system
state is monitored using sensors deployed at the nodes as well
as the transmission lines, which measure the power injections
and the forward and reverse power flows, respectively. These
measurements are collected at the fusion center. Under the
DC power flow model, the measurements at the t-th sampling
instance z[t] ∈ Rm are related to the system state x[t] ∈ Rn
in a linear fashion [20], given by
z[t] = Hx[t] + e[t], t = 1, 2, · · · , k. (1)
where H =
[
h1 h2 · · · hn
]
∈ Rm×n is the system
measurement matrix and e[t] is the sensor measurement noise,
which is assumed to be white Gaussian and independent of the
system state x[t]. At each time slot t, one convenient way to
estimate the system state xˆ[t] from measurement vector z[t] is
using the least squares estimation method, and the closed-form
solution is given by
xˆ[t] =
(
HTH
)−1
HTz[t]. (2)
After state estimation, BDD checks for possible measure-
ment inconsistencies by comparing the residual
r[t] =
∥∥z[t]−Hxˆ[t]∥∥
2
, (3)
against a pre-defined threshold τ, and an alarm is raised
if r[t] ≥ τ . Threshold τ is selected to maintain a certain
false-positive rate. We consider a strong attacker model who
has read and write access to the sensor measurements. The
objective of the attacker is to construct FDI attack vectors
that can bypass BDD. Note that designing a stealthy attack
is equivalent to finding a nonzero vector in col(H) [7].
Therefore, it can be constructed from the basis of R(H)
without knowing system measurement matrix. The basis is
obtained by applying SVD on the estimated sample covariance
matrix.
A. Existing Data-Driven FDI Scheme
The data-driven approach proposed in [7] is based on the
subspace of the covariance matrix of z[t]. Because the noise
is additive white Gaussian, the covariance matrix of z[t] can
be described as
Σz = HΣxH
T + σ2Im = Φ+ σ
2Im, (4)
where Σx denotes the sample covariance matrix of the states
and noise power σ2 is unknown. Assuming that the system
measurement matrix H is of full column rank and states
covariance matrix Σx is non-singular, the pseudorank of Φ
is n.
Applying SVD to Σz , we have
Σz = UΛV
T , (5)
where Λ = diag
{
λ1 λ2 · · · λm
}
is a diagonal matrix,
with its entries being the eigenvalues of Σz in descending
order, and
U =
[
u1 u2 · · · um
]
, (6)
are the corresponding eigenvectors.
Since λn+1 = λn+2 = · · · = λm = σ
2, the first
n largest eigenvalues λ1, λ2, · · · , λn are referred to as the
dominant eigenvalues. After obtaining all the eigenvalues, the
information theoretic criteria (ITC) can be used for pesudorank
estimation, which is one of the widely used techniques [17].
Let Us =
[
u1 u2 · · · un
]
contain the first n columns of
U; then
HΣxH
T = UsΛsU
T
s
(7)
where
Λs = diag
{
λ1 − σ
2 λ2 − σ
2 · · · λn − σ
2
}
. (8)
SinceH andUs have independent columns, and meanwhile
Σx and Λs are nonsingular,Us forms a basis ofR(H) as well
as R(HΣxH
T ). The relationship between Us and H is given
by
Us = HQ, (9)
where Q =
[
q1 q2 · · · qn
]
∈ Rn×n is a invertible
matrix and u1 = Hq1. This is the theoretical foundations
for data-driven FDI techniques. Generate a non-zero vector
c[t] ∈ Rn×1, either random or deterministic. Then, the attack
vector a[t] is constructed by [7],
a[t] = Usc[t]. (10)
III. THE PROPOSED DATA-DRIVEN FDI SCHEME
Comparing with the existing data-driven scheme, the pro-
posed scheme have two main advantages.
1) First of all, the error of the estimated eigenvectors Us
are inversely proportional to the eigenvalues [19]. Since
a larger error will cause larger residuals and increase
the probability to be detected by BDD, for the proposed
data-driven FDI scheme, only the first dominant eigen-
vector is used to construct the attack vector.
2) An additional advantage is that pseudorank estimation
is not required in the proposed scheme. Instead of full-
size SVD, a reduced version of the SVD is sufficient,
such as the thin, compact and truncated SVDs. They are
faster and have a lower storage requirement.
For the proposed data-driven FDI scheme, the attack vector
or false data is constructed as
a[t] = c[t]u1, (11)
where c[t] is either a deterministic or random number, and u1
denotes the first column of the estimated signal subspace Us.
Compromised measurement za[t] is obtained by injecting
a[t] into the original measurements [5],
za[t] = Hx[t] + e[t] + a[t]. (12)
Fig. 1. A circuit diagram of the IEEE 14-bus test system [21].
After state estimation, we have
za[t]−Hxˆ[t] = Π
⊥
(
e[t] + a[t]
)
. (13)
where
Π⊥ = I−H
(
HTH
)−1
HT . (14)
Let ra[t] be the residual contributed by a[t], which is given
by
ra[t] =
∥∥Π⊥a[t]∥∥
2
=
∥∥c[t]Π⊥u1∥∥2, (15)
and substituting u1 = Hq1 into (15), where q1 is a non-zero
column vector, we have
ra[t] =
∥∥c[t]Π⊥Hq1∥∥2. (16)
Since
Π⊥H = 0 and ra[t] = 0, (17)
the proposed data-driven FDI scheme using the first dominant
eigenvector is stealthy and can bypass BDD.
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. Experiment Results
As shown in Fig. 1, the IEEE 14-bus system with 11 load
buses is chosen as the test system. The software toolbox
MATPOWER [21] is utilized to generate the measurements.
Real power load data on January 02, 2016 from New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO) is fed into the IEEE
14-bus system. Sampling interval is 5 minutes. NYISO con-
sists of 11 regions and is marked from A to K in Fig. 2.
The following procedures are utilized to estimate system states
using load patterns from NYISO:
• Link the buses of the IEEE 14-bus system to regions of
NYISO as follows:[
2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14
F C I B G K E H J D A
]
,
where the row is the bus number of the IEEE 14-bus
system and the second row represents the NYISO region
index in Fig. 2.
• Normalize the load data collected from NYISO accord-
ingly, the DC power flow model is considered [5]. For
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Fig. 2. Region index of NYISO
each set of the power loads, optimal power flow (OPF)
is used to extract the system states.
• White Gaussian noise with amplitude 0.1 is added to the
raw measurements. All the results are obtained over 5000
independent trials.
Fig. 3 shows the BDD bypassing probability versus ob-
servation time for different probability of false alarm pFA
ratios. Noise amplitude is 0.1 and ‖a‖2 = 100. As shown
in Fig. 3, a similar performance is achieved for the proposed
data-driven FDI scheme without knowing the measurement
matrix as compared to benchmark [5]. However, performance
deterioration occurs for the proposed approach if only a
few measurements are available, since the estimated signal
subspace is erroneous with a limited number of measurements,
which generates a larger residual and increases the probability
of being detected by BDD.
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Fig. 3. Probability to bypass BDD versus observation time for different
probability of false alarm ratios. Sampling interval is 5 minutes.
B. Simulation Results
First, we consider the effects of the number of columns used
to construct FDI attacks. The proposed approach is compared
with benchmark [5], which assumes that the measurement
matrix H is known. The noise amplitude is 1, ‖a‖2 = 200
and pFA = 0.01. As shown in Fig. 4, using more columns
will reduce the probability to bypass BDD. The results are
consistent with the observations in [19], which shows that the
error of the estimated eigenvectors are inversely proportional
to the eigenvalues. A larger error will cause larger residuals.
Therefore, for a given number of measurements, using more
eigenvectors will increase the probability of being detected by
BDD. It is better to using a smaller number of columns to
obtain a higher BDD bypassing probability, especially when
the number of measurements or observation time is limited.
This is one of the motivations of using only the first dominant
eigenvector to construct FDI attacks.
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Fig. 4. Probability to bypass BDD versus number of columns used to construct
FDI attacks.
In the second test, the proposed scheme is compared with
the data-driven scheme in [7] and benchmark [5], which
assumes that the measurement matrix is known. The noise
amplitude is 1, attacking strength ‖a‖2 = 100, and probability
of false alarm pFA = 0.01. As shown in Fig. 5, the proposed
scheme outperforms [7] and is close to the benchmark, even
with a limited number of measurements. On the other hand, for
[7], a large number of measurements are required to achieve
a reasonable BDD bypassing probability. Furthermore, even
more measurements are required if the measurements are
highly correlated, which is common in real applications.
In the last test, we evaluate the effects of attacking strength
‖a‖2. Noise amplitude is 1 and pFA = 0.01. As shown in
Fig. 6, accuracy of the estimated signal subspace is critical
for the data-driven techniques. The allowed attacking strength
is affected by the accuracy of the estimated signal subspace.
This is a limitation of the data-driven schemes, when compared
with benchmark [5].
V. CONCLUSION
The emerging data-driven FDI attack in power grids has
been studied. A truncated SVD based computationally efficient
data-driven FDI attacking scheme was proposed using only
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the first dominant eigenvector of the measurement covariance
matrix. As a result, the pseudorank or model order information
is not required. Furthermore, trade-offs between the attacking
strength and accuracy of the estimated signal subspace were
investigated. Although the work has been presented from an
attacker’s points of view, the insight provided by the proposed
scheme is also helpful for system operators. Furthermore, the
key idea of the proposed scheme can be applied to other cyber-
physical systems with a similar linear model.
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